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Abstract: We find strong evidence of country interdependence in the pricing of
default risk, which suggests that a crisis can easily propagate from countries with
weak fiscal fundamentals to other fiscally sounder member States. Interest rate
interdependence differs between countries with high interest rates – high yielders
– and countries with low interest rates – low yielders –. The former countries are
linked through global spreads; i. e. they are exposed to the interest rate spreads
(over Germany) of other troubled countries to a degree which increases with fiscal
proximity. Low yielders with sounder fiscal fundamentals are partially immune
from the high interest rates of fiscally weak member States but are still exposed to
the risk of a euro break-up that is priced in Quanto CDS. This “euro risk” factor is a
main driver of the interest rate spreads of low yielders until August 2012. More
importantly, our case study of Italy shows that the impact of the global spread
variable is dominated by changes in market sentiment, a sign that the Italian
2011–2012 crisis had the characteristics of a debt run more than a crisis of
fundamentals. This evidence suggests that Eurobonds would be justified as an
instrument for crisis prevention in the absence of a “lender of last resort”. With the
announcement of OMTs, the ECB seems to have taken such role upon itself,
mainly as a response to the risk of a euro break-up. We show that OMTs led to
a significant fall in the impact effect of the global spread variable in the Italian
case. The ECB’s ability to buy member States’ bonds reduces the risk of a self-
fulfilling debt run but also deprives Eurobonds of their role in crisis prevention.
Proposals to introduce Eurobonds to finance investment projects and expenditures
related to the security and refugee crisis appear more realistic.
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1 Introduction
After reaching a peak in November 2011 and again in the spring of 2012, interest
rate differentials, i. e. yield spreads, between government bonds in the euro area
have finally narrowed back to pre-crisis levels, marking the end of the European
sovereign debt crisis. The ESM–ECB framework for financial assistance has been
successful in stabilizing investors’ expectations and restoring market confi-
dence. In particular, the ECB announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMTs) in August 2012 seems to have played a key role in reducing the Italian
and Spanish yield spreads over German Bunds.
Eurobond proposals during the European debt crisis of 2010–2012 focused
on their potential role in preventing a self-fulfilling liquidity crisis not justified
by fiscal fundamentals and its spreading to the whole euro area. These propo-
sals were based on the idea that Eurobonds jointly guaranteed by all member
States would ensure continuous market access to countries facing a liquidity
crisis. Although it is always difficult to distinguish whether a crisis is one of
solvency or liquidity, as both aspects are usually present at the same time, in
this paper we report evidence that, starting in the second half of 2011, the Italian
yield spread over Germany was significantly affected by changes in market
sentiment. We extend Favero and Missale (2012) to consider a common “euro
risk” factor reflecting euro devaluation risk, and possibly the risk of a euro
break-up, that we measure through the average Quanto CDS of euro-area coun-
tries. We focus on the period of the European sovereign debt crisis from
November 2009 to November 2015 and split this sample into two sub-periods,
before and after August 2012, in order to assess the impact of the ECB announce-
ment of OMTs.
We find strong evidence of country interdependence in the pricing of
default risk, which suggests that a crisis can easily propagate from countries
with weak fiscal fundamentals to other fiscally sounder member States.
However, interest rate interdependence differs between countries with high
interest rates – high yielders – and countries with low interest rates – low
yielders-, and over time. The former countries are linked through global
spreads; i. e. they are exposed to the yield spreads of other troubled countries
to a degree which increases with fiscal proximity. Low yielders with sounder
fiscal fundamentals are partially immune from the high yield spreads of
fiscally weak member States but are still exposed to the risk of a devaluation
or break-up of the euro that is priced in Quanto CDS. This “euro risk” factor is
the main driver of the yield spreads of low yielders until August 2012, which
suggests that a broader crisis of the euro area is the channel through which
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a debt default in a country with weak fundamentals can propagate to safer
member States. More importantly, our case study of Italy shows that the impact
of the global spread variable is dominated by changes in market sentiment –
a sign that the Italian 2011–2012 crisis had the characteristics of a debt run
more than a crisis of fundamentals. This evidence suggests that the introduc-
tion of Eurobonds as an instrument for crisis prevention would be economic-
ally justified. Eurobonds would be in the interest not only of States with
financing difficulties but also of States with stronger fundamentals in that a
debt default of, say, Italy or Spain would rapidly propagate to the whole
Monetary Union.
The other rationale for Eurobonds is the absence of a “lender of last resort”
who can prevent a debt run.1 With the announcement of OMTs, the ECB seems to
have taken such role upon itself, mainly as a response to the risk of a euro
break-up. This has led to a steady decline in Quanto CDSs and to a significant
fall in the yield spreads of Italy and Spain over Germany. The stabilizing effect
that the ECB announcement had on market expectations is well evidenced in our
econometric analysis by the reduction in the impact effect of the global spread
variable in the Italian case. As the ECB’s decision to buy government bonds of
member States receiving financial assistance from the ESM reduces the risk of a
self-fulfilling debt run, it also weakens the case for using Eurobonds as a crisis
prevention instrument.2
The ESM–ECB framework for crisis prevention has stabilized investors’
expectations and, most likely, eliminated the need for Eurobonds even if the
ECB cannot act as a genuine lender of last resort.3 More importantly, the
introduction of Eurobonds for crisis prevention faces strong political opposition
because it raises moral hazard issues and entails economic costs that safer
member States are not willing to pay. By contrast, proposals to issue
1 The ECB cannot act as a genuine lender of last resort as Art. 123(1) TFEU prohibits the ECB
from providing any type of credit facility to governments or other public authorities, and from
directly purchasing their debt instruments. In fact, OMTs have been justified as secondary
market bond purchases in the context of the ECB’s open market operations (Art. 18 of
‘Protocol No.4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European
Central Bank) with the aim of “safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission
and the singleness of the monetary policy” (ECB, 2012).
2 The fulfillment of this expectation also hinges on compliance with Art. 123(1) TFEU and the
jurisprudence of national constitutional courts.
3 The ECB is not allowed to buy government bonds directly from member States (Art. 123(1)
TFEU), and “a necessary condition for OMTs is strict and effective conditionality attached to an
appropriate ESM programme” (ECB, 2012).
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Eurobonds for expenditures that provide clear benefits to all member States may
gain political consensus. This would be the case of investment projects and of
extraordinary expenditures to deal with security concerns and the refugee crisis.
As these problems are common to all member States and the expenditures
incurred by each member State have clear positive externalities, Eurobonds
seem the appropriate instruments to share the cost and the credit risk associated
with their financing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After this Introduction,
Section 2 discusses the potential roles and proposals of Eurobonds. In Section
3 we report a graphical decomposition of interest rate spreads between euro-area
government bonds and German bonds into their default and non-default com-
ponents, and we explore their behavior and determinants. Section 3 presents the
estimation results of the Global VAR model of euro-area sovereign spreads
introduced by Favero and Missale (2012) and Favero (2013). This section also
addresses the issue of contagion using a multi GARCH model, and reports an
estimate of the effect of the ECB announcement of OMTs on the Italian yield
spread. Section 5 discusses the implications for the role of Eurobonds of OMTs
and, more generally, of the ESM–ECB scheme of financial assistance. Section 6
concludes the analysis with a proposal for introducing Eurobonds.
2 What use for Eurobonds?
Considering alternative objectives that Eurobonds backed by (several and) joint
guarantees can help to achieve is a better starting point than stating their
benefits and costs because, depending on these objectives, Eurobonds should
have different characteristics, be issued in different amounts, and possibly will
have different costs.
Eurobonds can be used to achieve different policy goals. In this paper we
focus on three main objectives: (i) to promote further integration of euro area
bond markets; (ii) to halt a debt crisis not justified by fundamentals, i. e. a self-
fulfilling “debt run”; (iii) to finance EU-wide projects such as infrastructure or
extraordinary spending needs. We review each of them in turn.
2.1 Bond market integration
Promoting further integration of euro area financial markets (perhaps, together
with greater fiscal coordination) was the “classic” objective in the original
558 C.A. Favero and A. Missale
Brought to you by | Università degli Studi di Milano
Authenticated
Download Date | 5/4/17 12:43 PM
proposal of Eurobonds by the Giovannini Group Report (2000), later followed by
the Monti Report (2010). Apart from lower segmentation and better functioning
of euro financial markets, the proposal hinges on the idea that a fully integrated
market would deliver liquidity gains to all and, possibly, boost the role of the
euro as a reserve currency. In particular, small issuers (representing a tiny
fraction of the euro bond market) paying a high liquidity premium would mostly
benefit from a jointly guaranteed Eurobond, but even Germany would benefit
from having its bonds traded in a market potentially as thick and liquid as the
US market. Evidence of a sizeable, say, 40 basis-point liquidity premium in favor
of US Treasuries over German Bunds was taken as the potential reduction in
borrowing costs that would derive from greater liquidity. Summing up, this
argument for Eurobonds focuses on secondary markets and its relevance is
strictly related to the importance of liquidity premia in bond yields. Two impor-
tant points must be made at this stage. First, since a large market size is a
necessary (but not sufficient) condition to reap liquidity gains, the outstanding
amount of Eurobonds should be large, say, comparable to US Treasuries. This
cannot be done overnight, unless through redenomination, which however
raises a number of economic and legal issues. The second important point is
that, unlike crisis prevention, market integration offers a rationale for German
participation. As credit risk mutualisation penalizes safe borrowers, liquidity is
the only reason why Germany might reduce its borrowing costs and directly
benefit from the issuance of Eurobonds.
2.2 Debt crisis prevention
The objective to avoid a debt crisis not justified by fiscal fundamentals and its
propagation to safer member States has been at the center stage of Eurobond
proposals during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010–2012. The idea is
that Eurobonds guaranteed by all member States would ensure continuous
market access for countries with weaker fiscal fundamentals and thus more
exposed to changes in market sentiment. The possibility to rely on Eurobonds
would be especially valuable to countries hit by a roll-over crisis when the
demand for new bonds dries up because of each investor’s fears that other
investors will shy away in a panic equilibrium reminiscent of a self-fulling
bank run. Absent a central bank acting as a lender of last resort, a self-fulfilling
debt run is possible and Eurobonds may provide an alternative to central bank
intervention in stabilizing investors’ expectations and preventing a panic equili-
brium. To the extent that a debt crisis widens interest rate spread on Bunds,
impairs borrowing conditions in the euro area, and propagates to safe member
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States, Eurobonds may clearly benefit more countries than just those experien-
cing a debt run. The insurance that Eurobonds would provide to States with
weaker fundamentals, like Italy and Spain, would also work as insurance for
others. Although it is always difficult to distinguish between solvency and
liquidity crises, as solvency is inherently difficult to evaluate and both aspects
are usually present at the same time, Favero and Missale (2012) report evidence
on Italian and Spanish interest rate spreads over Germany that points to a
significant component of such spreads due to changes in market sentiment
since the summer of 2011.
Interestingly, crisis prevention arguments focus on the primary market
and are not concerned with achieving a large market size. In principle,
Eurobonds might not even need to be issued since what matters (as in the
case of OMTs) is the reassuring effect on investors’ expectations of endowing
countries with an instrument for market access of last resort. However, it is
worth noting that risk mutualisation would not be without costs for safer
member States; even in the case that Eurobonds would not be issued by a
country with financing difficulties, the option to do it would increase the
expected liabilities of other member States. For this reason, Eurobonds jointly
guaranteed by all member States may possibly raise the borrowing costs on
all type of bonds.
The establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the
ESM–ECB framework for financial assistance have likely deprived Eurobonds
of their role in crisis prevention, in that a country experiencing a liquidity crisis
can now rely on ESM financial assistance, i. e. a credit line to be used for bond
purchases on the primary market, and on OMTs, i. e. ECB bond purchases on the
secondary market.
2.3 EU-wide project financing
The third argument for Eurobonds is that they are the appropriate instruments to
finance projects and/or expenditures that provide benefits to all member States
(in proportions that cannot be assessed) also because of spillover effects and/or
externalities. This is clearly the case for infrastructure such as roads and rail-
ways connecting two or more member States that facilitate mobility within the
EU. However, a similar argument can be made for any investment project that,
independently of location, increases output across the EU through spillover
effects. More recently, it has been argued that extraordinary expenditures to
deal with the refugee crisis and expenditures for security following terrorist
attacks should be financed with Eurobonds. As these problems are common to
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all member States and the expenditures incurred by each member State have
clear positive externalities to other States, sharing the cost and the credit risk
associated with their financing is economically justified. A potential advantage
of Eurobond financing would be to create fiscal space in national budgets
without lengthy negotiations on budget flexibility.
It is worth noting that a Eurobond program for specific projects would be
limited in the amount of bonds outstanding so that a liquidity premium will
have to be paid. Nevertheless, the introduction of Eurobonds backed by (several
and) joint guarantees would represent an important first experiment to test
investors’ demand and borrowing costs. In fact, bonds issued by the ESM or
the European Investment Bank are guaranteed by the capital that member States
have provided to such institutions; they are, therefore, similar to bonds backed
by several but not joint guarantees. Finally, the announcement of a common
program would enhance the credibility of EU institutions by signaling a political
will for greater fiscal unity and cooperation, thus paving the way for a deeper
reform of EU fiscal governance.
3 Default versus non-default component
In this section we examine evidence on long-term interest rate differentials
between euro-area government bonds and German bonds for the period 2007–
2015 in order to identify their determinants. In particular, we aim to disen-
tangle interest differentials into their main components: a default premium
and a non-default premium reflecting liquidity risk and factors related to
expected variations in the exchange rate.4 Assessing the relative importance
of such components is crucial to understand the role that Eurobonds
can play.
Long-term interest rate differentials between 10-year euro-area government
bonds and German Bunds co-move with an unstable pattern over time. Interest
spreads over Germany converged significantly with the introduction of the euro,
narrowing from highs in excess of 300 basis points in the pre-EMU period to
less than 30 basis points about one year after the introduction of the euro. Yet,
bonds issued by euro-area member States have never been regarded as perfect
substitutes by market participants. Interest rate differentials co-moved synchro-
4 Bernoth et al. (2012), Di Cesare et al. (2012) and Calvori et al. (2016) also consider an “exces-
sive fear” related component.
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nously at a very low level between the start of the EMU and the subprime loan
crisis. Differentials became sizeable during 2008 and 2009 with some separa-
tion in co-movement between high-debt and low-debt countries. The European
sovereign debt crisis from the end of 2009 onwards produced interest differ-
entials of the same or even greater magnitude than those of the pre-EMU era,
and more heterogeneity in co-movement. Interest rates have progressively
returned to a convergence pattern after the announcement by the ECB of
OMTs in August 2012.
3.1 Default premium, liquidity risk and devaluation risk
Interest rate differentials, i. e. yield spreads, between government bonds of euro-
area countries should price three factors: default risk, liquidity risk and expected
devaluation, say, because of currency redenomination. The latter factor may
emerge, for example, because of a euro break-up following a major credit event
or a German exit from the Eurozone.
Sovereign issuers that are perceived as having a greater solvency risk must
pay investors a default premium. Liquidity risk is the risk of having to sell (or
buy) a bond in a thin market and, thus, at a loss of value and/or higher
transaction costs. Small issuers with low volumes of bonds outstanding and
thus small markets must compensate investors with a liquidity premium. The
introduction of the euro in January 1999 initially eliminated the expectations
of exchange rate variations, but the general surge in the debt-to-GDP ratio of
euro-area countries after 2009 has led markets to reconsider the possibility of
some member States’ exit from the euro and even the collapse of the common
currency.
Favero and Missale (2010, 2012) show that default risk is the main driver of
yield spreads, with non-default risk playing a role only in the case of small
issuers and, more generally, during the global financial crisis. The non-default
premium, indeed, appears to be very small with the exception of Finland,
the Netherlands, and France in 2008 and 2009. This component is clearly
time-varying and fluctuates between around 10 basis points in calm periods
and around 50 basis points during crises. The risk of devaluation of euro-
denominated assets in case of a major credit event, possibly leading to a
break-up of the euro, is not considered in Favero and Missale (2012) as their
sample period ends in August 2011, when such risk only began to be perceived.
In what follows, we extend the analysis to consider the impact of a proxy for
euro devaluation risk.
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3.2 Default, liquidity and devaluation risk: the evidence
We extend the original framework in Favero and Missale (2012) by keeping the
same measure of default risk and by introducing a proxy for euro devaluation
risk. We use data associated with 10-year benchmark government bonds issued
by ten European countries, namely, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands which are the most fre-
quently traded bonds in local and Euro MTS markets. Bond yields, i. e. interest
rates, are taken from Datastream.
Figure 1 graphs the 10-year maturity bond yields of the countries under
analysis. The graph suggests that the European sovereign bond market has
experienced three different phases. Until to 2009, bond yields tend to co-move
strongly and their variation is fairly low. From the start of the European sover-
eign debt crisis in late 2009, the bond yields start to diverge. The gap between
yields across member States increased throughout 2011. Beginning in 2012, the
European sovereign bond market showed clear signs of segmentation. Bonds
could be classified into high yielders (Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal) and low
yielders (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, and the Netherlands).
This segmentation is very important in explaining the dynamics of yield spreads
with respect to their driving factors.
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Figure 1: 10-Y Government bond yield in the Euro area.
Note: Yields in % annual terms
Source: Datastream/Thomson Financial.
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Default risk is measured using CDS spreads. A CDS is a swap contract in which
the protection buyer of the CDS makes a series of premium payments to the
protection seller and, in exchange, receives a payoff if the bond goes into
default. The difference between a CDS on a member State bond and the CDS
on the German Bund of the same maturity is a measure of the default risk
premium of that State relative to Germany.
To capture the risk of devaluation of euro-denominated assets, which is
possibly associated with the risk of a euro break-up, we use the Quanto CDS, a
measure introduced by De Santis (2015). The Quanto CDS is defined as the
difference between the CDS quotes in US dollar and euros for the same
country. That difference between the US dollar – and the euro-denominated
CDS spreads represents the premium that market participants are willing to
pay to receive protection in US dollars so as to avoid the risk that the euro (or
an eventual new legacy currency) depreciates against the dollar after a default
in a member State. De Santis shows that the Quanto CDS is equal to the
expected (present value) loss from receiving protection in euros instead of
dollars in case of default, and it thus depends on the probabilities of default
in future periods of the contract multiplied by the payout upon default and the
expected rate of depreciation in these future periods. In other words, the
Quanto CDS is a “credit-event-probability-weighted” currency premium asso-
ciated with the payout from default. This measure is available from 2010
onwards. Figure 2 graphs 10-year maturity Quanto CDS rates for the countries
under analysis.
The behavior of the Quanto CDS of euro-area countries is characterized by
a strong co-movement along a common trend with cross-country differences
that vary within a 50 basis point band (with Spain exhibiting wider fluctua-
tions). In fact, Quanto CDS differ across euro-area countries because of differ-
ent probabilities of default and payouts, but they are characterized by a
common trend in that a credit event in one country will affect the Quanto
CDS of other countries through expected depreciation, currency risk and
default probabilities. Therefore, the common trend displayed in Figure 2 repre-
sents the euro devaluation risk that, we think, correlates with the risk of a euro
break-up.5 Having measured the Quanto CDS for each country, we take the
simple average across all euro-area countries to eliminate the effect of country-
specific factors and outliers. The average Quanto CDS constitutes a common
5 It is worth noting that a credit event does not imply the break-up of the euro area, as in the
Greek case in March 2012. Quoting De Santis (2015), “the Quanto CDS measures the risk
associated with the depreciation against the US dollar and not the intra-euro area currency
risk”.
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risk factor that captures expectations of underperformance of the Euro with
respect to the US dollar upon occurrence of a credit event that triggers CDS
payments. We call this common factor the “devaluation risk” or “euro risk”
factor.
Figure 3(a) and (b) report the yield spreads for euro-area countries relative to
Germany, along with their default and non-default components. We group euro-
area countries into low yielders in Figure 3(a) and high yielders in Figure 3(b).
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Figure 2: Quanto spreads.
Source: Datastream/Thomson Financial.
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In particular, we report the yield spreads between 10-year government bonds
and German Bunds (blue line) along with: the associated CDS spreads (red line),
the residual non-default component (black line), and the “euro risk” factor, i. e.
the average Quanto CDS in the euro area (green line).
The following facts emerge from the data:
i. The first important fact about the co-movements of yield spreads in the
euro area is that their interdependence is not constant over time, and it
differs between countries with high interest rates – high yielders – and
countries with low interest rates – low yielders-.
ii. In the case of high yielders, the CDS differential relative to Germany, i. e.
the default risk component of the yield spread, accounts for virtually the
entire yield differential (and its variability) from the beginning of the
sample to the end of 2010. The gap between the yield spread and its
default component that emerges between 2010 and 2012 is strongly related
to the “euro risk” factor. With the steady decline in the risk of a euro
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Figure 3a: The default and non-default component in yields spreads – Low Yielders.
Source: Datastream/Thomson Financial.
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break-up, from August 2012 onward, the non-default component goes
back to fluctuating close to zero.
iii. The case of low-yielders is mixed. In Austria and France the default risk
component of the yield spread accounts for almost the entire yield differ-
ential (and its variability) from 2009 to mid-2011. Then, in the midst of the
European debt crisis, a non-default component of about 40 basis points
emerges; however, this component bears no close relationship to the
“euro risk” factor. By contrast, Finland and the Netherlands exhibit a
small, volatile and at times negative CDS differential relative to
Germany, with the non-default component accounting for the largest
part of the yield differential. It is however difficult to interpret this
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Figure 3b: The default and non-default component in yields spreads – Low Yielders.
Source: Datastream/Thomson Financial.
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non-default component as representing a liquidity premium as it corre-
lates with the “euro risk” factor, at least until the beginning of 2012.
iv. Until 2011 the non-default component of the yield spread is small for all
member States, not exceeding 50 basis points (except in Finland), but it
becomes sizeable in the midst of the European debt crisis, fluctuating
around or above 100 basis points in the case of high yielders. The
simultaneous increase in the “euro risk” factor suggests that euro deva-
luation or break-up risk, rather than liquidity risk, is the likely explana-
tion of such large non-default components.
v. For all countries, before 2010 and after 2013, non-default components are
unlikely to reflect the risk of devaluation or a break-up of the euro, and thus
provide a rough estimate of liquidity premia. During the global financial
crisis the non-default component is sizeable in Finland, reaching 70 basis
point, and not negligible, around 40–50 basis points, in Belgium, the
Netherlands, and France. However, in the aftermath of the European debt
crisis, the component of the spread likely due to liquidity problems becomes
very small, around 25 basis points in Finland and the Netherlands, and even
lower, around 10 basis points, in Austria and France.
Our analysis suggests that the greater liquidity of Eurobonds (if introduced on a
large scale) would mostly benefit small issuers with some reduction in their
borrowing costs. However, as we have just looked at interest rate differentials
relative to Germany, we cannot exclude that liquidity might improve for Germany
and the other large issuers as well, thus determining a generalized reduction in
the level of interest rates. On the other hand, we are skeptical that any such
reduction would be significant for at least two reasons. First, it is hard to imagine
a further reduction in interest rates below their currently negative levels. Second,
as shown by Favero and Missale (2012), the liquidity premium of about 40 basis
points that German Bunds historically paid on US Treasuries, has reversed in favor
of Germany after the global financial crisis. To conclude, reductions in borrowing
costs from a potentially larger and more liquid market for Eurobonds are likely to
be small and mostly appealing to small issuers. Arguments for Eurobonds based
on liquidity enhancements and, consequently, lower costs appear weak, although
they cannot be completely dismissed.
4 Fiscal fundamentals, global risk and contagion
Having shown that default risk is the main driver of yield spreads with some
additional role for euro devaluation and break-up risk, in this section we
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examine the relative importance of fiscal fundamentals, global risk factors and
contagion. The analysis follows Favero and Missale (2012) where we find
strong evidence that changes in market sentiment significantly affect yield
spreads in the Euro area and have an important role in propagating the
debt crisis.
We focus on the default premium component of yield spreads, and model it
as a linear function of local fiscal fundamentals, i. e. the expected debt-to-GDP
and deficit-to-GDP ratios, the “euro risk” factor, and a global risk factor that we
call the “global spread”, which interacts the spreads of the other member States
with local fiscal fundamentals to capture the global risk that a country faces.
The global spread variable is country-specific and is obtained as the weighted
average of other countries’ spreads with weights reflecting fiscal proximity, that
is, the distance of their debt and deficit ratios to the same variables of the
country considered; the closer the debt and the deficit of the country considered
to those of another country, the greater the weight assigned to the yield spread
of that country. This makes the exposure of each country to the spreads of the
other countries in the euro area depend on the “distance” between their fiscal
fundamentals. The main novelty relative to Favero and Missale (2012) is the
introduction of a common “euro risk” factor, i. e. the average Quanto CDS, to
consider the risk of a euro break-up.6 Finally, we split our sample into two sub-
periods, before and after August 2012, in order to assess the impact on the
estimated coefficients of the ECB announcement on August 2 of OMTs, i. e.
secondary market purchases of government bonds of member States receiving
financial assistance from the ESM.
4.1 A GVAR model of yield spreads
We estimate by Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) the following 10-equa-
tions (countries) Global VAR (GVAR) for the 10-year yield spreads on German
Bunds for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, using daily data over the period November
2009 to November 2015:
6 We restrict our analysis to the euro debt crisis period and use daily data, while Favero and
Missale (2012) used weekly data over the period June 2006–August 2011. As a result, we do not
include in our specification global factors such as the US Baa-Aaa bond spread, which is very
stable over the restricted sample period.
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The model relates yield spreads, i. e. the difference between the yield Yit of a
country i and the German yield YGt , to the difference in debt- and deficit-to-GDP
ratios, bit − b
G
t and d
i
t −d
G
t , the common ‘euro risk’ factor, ERt, and the global
spread GSit.
Following Attinasi et al. (2010), for fiscal fundamentals we consider the
average for a 2-year period of the expected deficit-to-GDP ratio, dit, and the
expected debt-to-GDP ratio, bit. The expected variables are the European
Commission Forecasts that are released on a bi-annual basis. We include in
the model the difference between each country’s forecast and the forecast of the
same variables for Germany. The common ‘euro risk’ factor, ERt, that captures
the euro devaluation risk and possibly the risk of a euro break-up, is obtained as
the simple average of the Quanto CDS of the countries under consideration, as
explained in Section 3.2. The global spread, GSit, captures the global (euro area)
risk that a country faces. It is constructed as a country-specific stochastic trend
that is mostly driven by the yield spreads of the countries that have fiscal
fundamentals more similar (or less distant) to the country considered.
Specifically, the global spread is measured for each country by a weighted
average of yield spreads of other countries. Weights, wijt , are the inverse of the
fiscal distance, distijt , which is defined as the absolute value of the difference
between the fiscal fundamentals, dt and bt, of two countries, i and j (normalized
by their 3 and 60 percent limits). Hence, weights are constructed to make the
global spread more dependent on the spreads of those countries that are more
similar in terms of fiscal fundamentals. The time-varying weights, related to the
changing forecasts for fiscal fundamentals, have the potential of explaining the
changing correlation of spreads observed in the descriptive analysis of the
previous section. The global spread variable is inspired by the construction of
global variables in the GVAR modeling approach (see, e.g., Pesaran et al., 2004;
Dees et al., 2007), where global macro variables are constructed for each country
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by using trade weights; we simply replace trade shares with the above measure
of fiscal proximity, wijt . Using the distance in terms of fiscal fundamentals makes
the global spread country-specific and the weights not constant, unlike in
standard GVAR based on trade shares. Note that the global spread variables
vary at daily frequency only for the fluctuations in the yield spreads, while the
low frequency fluctuations depend both on the fluctuations in the yield spreads
and on the changes in the weights. As the latter occurs only biannually, no
endogeneity problem for the weights should arise.
We estimate the model over the full sample and over two subsamples: from
November 2009 to 1 August 2012 and from 2 August 2012 to November 2015. The
split in subsamples is introduced to assess the impact of the ECB announcement
of OMTs on the relation between yield spreads and their determinants; local
fiscal fundamentals, global spreads, and the “euro risk” factor.
4.2 The empirical evidence
The results of the estimation, which are reported in Table 1 in the Appendix, can
be summarized as follows:
i. All spreads are very persistent. This implies that long-run means are very
imprecisely estimated because yield spreads tend to display a stochastic
trend that first slopes upward and then downward.
ii. The effect of fiscal fundamentals, when they are not interacted with the
yield spreads of other member States, is rarely significant. The debt ratio
is significant only in Ireland over the second period, and in the case of
low yielders but with the wrong sign. The deficit is significant only in
Ireland and Portugal over the first sample period, and in Austria and
Spain over the second period.
iii. The common “euro risk” factor (capturing the risk of a euro break-up) is
strongly significant for all countries, except for Portugal, before the ECB
announcements of OMTs while its decline over the second period signifi-
cantly reduces the yield spreads of high yielders. Its impact on the yield
spread of the high yielders is also stronger and more persistent than on
the spread of low yielders.
iv. The global spread variable that makes the exposure to other countries’
yield spreads increase with the similarity of their debt and deficit ratios
(so as to link more closely the spreads of countries with similarly weak
fundamentals) is strongly significant in all member States with different
impact coefficients. The impact of the global spread is stronger on the
yield spread of high yielders than on the spread of low yielders.
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v. The ECB announcement of OMTs is associated with a steady decline of
yield spreads and the common “euro risk” factor, and with a change in
their relationship that differs across countries. In the case of low yielders,
the impact of the “euro risk” factor becomes either negative or not
significant whereas it remains significant and gains strength in the case
of high yielders.
vi. Panel restrictions cannot be imposed on the system as the coefficients
differ importantly across countries.
The evidence in Table 1 shows that global spreads are highly significant for
all countries considered while fiscal fundamentals have no effect at any con-
ventional significance level, with the exception of Ireland and Portugal and in
only one of the two subsamples. Fiscal fundamentals matter not per se but
because they determine the exposure of each country’s yield spread to the
yield spreads of the other member States. Fiscal proximity selects the reference
group of countries whose yield spreads determine the global spread to which a
country is exposed. Member States with sound fiscal fundamentals are
immune to the risk priced in the yield spreads of countries with fiscal problems
while member States with weak fundamentals are affected by the yield spreads
of troubled countries to the extent that they are fiscally similar. Hence, fiscal
fundamentals matter in the pricing of default risk but only as they determine
the exposure to other countries’ spreads, that is, to the global risk that the
market perceives. When global risk factors are muted, fiscal fundamentals
have no effect on yield spreads. This evidence suggests that markets do set
incentives for fiscal discipline but they do it discontinuously, namely only
when global systemic risk is perceived.
The effect of the ECB announcement of OMTs is found by comparing the
results of the estimation of the GVAR model over the two subsamples pre and
post August 2012. To this end it is worth noting that the period following the ECB
announcement is characterized by a steady decline in the “euro risk” factor, as
the risk of a euro break-up fell. This downward trend actually starts one week
before, on July 26, following Mario Draghi’s statement that he would do “what-
ever it takes” to defend the euro. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3(a) and (b),
the announcement of OMTs on 2 August 2012 marks the turning points in the
yield spreads of Italy and Spain, the two countries under greater debt-financing
stress at that time. In other member States, borrowing conditions seem instead
to have eased earlier, in the first half of 2012.
The ECB announcement of OMTs clearly led to a change in the relationship
between the yield spreads and the risk of a euro break-up that differs across
countries. In the case of low yielders, the impact of the “euro risk” factor
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becomes either negative or not significant whereas it remains significant and
gains strength in the case of high yielders. We interpret the result for the former
countries as evidence that the ECB announcement does not only reduce euro
devaluation risk and the probability of a break-up but it also makes the yield
spread of countries with sound fiscal fundamentals immune to such risks. By
contrast, sensitivity to the “euro risk” factor increases in countries with weaker
fiscal fundamentals. As fundamentals are expected to change slowly over time,
a lower devaluation risk is the main factor that drives their yield spreads down.
In fact, after the ECB announcement, the yield spreads of high yielders with
closer fiscal fundamentals decrease at the same pace, leaving the estimated
coefficient on the global spread statistically unaffected with the notable excep-
tion of Spain, where the yield spread displays some resilience, reflecting the
problems of its troubled banking sector. This evidence contrasts with that for
low yielders, where the estimated sensitivity to the global spread increases
significantly after the ECB announcement of OMTs. As the risk of a euro break-
up vanishes, it appears that the yield spreads of countries with sounder fiscal
fundamentals tend to co-move more synchronously with each other and with
those of weaker member States.
Summing up, there is strong evidence of country interdependence in the
pricing of default risk, which suggests that a crisis can easily propagate from
countries with weak fiscal fundamentals to fiscally sounder member States.
However, the channel of yield interdependence differs between high yielders
and low yielders and over the two sub-periods. The former countries are linked
through global spreads; i. e. they are exposed to the yield spreads of other
troubled countries to a degree which increases with fiscal proximity.7 Low yielders
with sounder fiscal fundamentals are partially immune to the high spreads of
fiscally weak countries but are still exposed to the risk of a devaluation or break-
up of the euro, as priced in Quanto CDS. This “euro risk” factor is the main driver
of the yield spreads of low yielders until August 2012, which suggests that a
broader crisis of the euro area is the channel through which a debt default in a
country with weak fundamentals can propagate to safer member States.
This evidence suggests that the introduction of Eurobonds would have been
in the interest not only of countries with debt-financing difficulties but also of
countries with stronger fundamentals in that a debt default of, say, Italy or
Spain would rapidly spread across the whole Monetary Union. However, for
Eurobonds to be justified as an instrument for crisis prevention, two conditions
must be satisfied. The first one concerns the nature of the debt crisis; only in the
case of a self-fulfilling liquidity crisis not due to fundamentals, Eurobonds
7 High yielders are also affected by the “euro-risk” over the entire sample period.
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would be economically justified and mostly effective at stabilizing investors’
expectations, thus avoiding a debt run. Although fiscal fundamentals do not
affect yield spreads directly, we have shown that they determine the exposure to
other countries’ yield spreads, that is, to the global risk that the market per-
ceives. The issue to which we turn in the next section is whether the impact of
the global spread variable is constant or dominated by changes in market
sentiment. The second condition for Eurobonds is the absence of a “lender of
last resort” who might solve a liquidity crisis. With the announcement of OMTs,
the ECB seems to have taken such role upon itself, mainly as a response to the
increase in the risk of a euro break-up. The strong reaction of the market,
leading to a dramatic fall in Quanto CDSs and yield spreads, is itself evidence
of the non-fundamental nature of the crisis. On the other hand, the ESM–ECB
plan for crisis prevention has most likely eliminated the need for Eurobonds
even if the ECB cannot act as a genuine lender of last resort because a necessary
condition for OMTs is that a country receives financial assistance from the ESM
and has thus committed to an adjustment program with policy conditions
attached.8 We turn to this issue in the last section.
4.3 Contagion in the EMU
Eurobonds are justified as instruments for crisis prevention if market sentiment
dominates the pricing of default risk. In fact, evidence of significant changes in
market sentiment would provide a good indicator of the likelihood of a debt
run, i. e. of a liquidity crisis driven by self-fulfilling expectations. Thus, the
relevant issue is whether the market’s assessment of sovereign risk in relation
to fiscal fundamentals and global risk is constant, and thus reliable, or subject
to shifts in sentiment; in other words, whether the impact of the global spread
variable is stable or changing over time. To address this issue we look at the
structural stability of the coefficient on the global spread variable. This is
crucial to assess the presence of contagion. Indeed, time variation in the
impact of the global spread variable on domestic yield spreads would imply
that shifts in market sentiment dominate the fundamentals-driven interdepen-
dence across countries.
8 Moreover, the ECB cannot purchase government bonds in the primary market, i. e. at
issuance, as Art. 123(1) TFEU prohibits the ECB from providing any type of credit facility to
governments or other public authorities, and from purchasing debt instruments from them
directly (see footnote 1 for further details).
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To measure the effect of contagion we study the case of Italy, estimating a
multivariate GARCH model of two equations for the yield spread and the asso-
ciated global spread. The estimated reduced form specification of our Global
VAR is
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This specification models the joint process of the Italian yield spread and the
global spread variable relevant to Italy, GSITt , as a persistent process with a mean
determined by the expected Italian fiscal fundamentals FFITt − 1. The latter are the
same debt and deficit ratios relative to Germany used in system specification (1),
while GFFt − 1 is the weighted average of the fiscal fundamentals relative to
Germany of other countries with weights determined by fiscal proximity to
Italy as in the global spread variable.
The identification of the structural parameters is achieved by a triangular-
ization of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals, Ht, based on the
assumption that the Italian yield spread is contemporaneously caused by the
global spread but not vice-versa. The model in equation (2) allows for a time-
varying conditional variance-covariance between the Italian yield spread and
the corresponding global spread in that the Ht matrix is updated every period.
In particular, the time-varying variance-covariance matrix of the residuals, Ht, is
modelled as a diagonal BEKK (Engle and Kroner, 1995) system. This specification
can, then, be used to generate a time-varying estimate of the impact of the
global spread on the Italian yield spread.
The model provides us with a natural measure of contagion: the dynamic
conditional beta in the terminology of Bali and Engle (2010), which is the
coefficient γt determining the effect of a shock in the global spread on the
Italian spread:
E εITt jεGSt
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where the hij, t are the estimated elements of the Ht matrix.
Variations in the coefficient γt are reported in Figure 4 along with the
estimates of the global spread coefficient obtained by SUR estimation of the
GVAR model in equation (1), and displayed as a continuous line for the two
subsamples, November 2009–July 2012 and August 2012–November 2015.
The impact of the global spread on the Italian yield spread varies signifi-
cantly over time, a clear sign of changes in market sentiment. During the
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European sovereign debt crisis, the sensitivity of the Italian yield spread to its
global spread became much higher than it would have been in the case of a
constant market reaction to global risk, as implied by SUR estimation of the
GVAR model.
Figure 5 provides an estimate of the effect of contagion as measured by the
difference between the impact effect of the global spread as estimated in the
multivariate GARCH model and that obtained from the constant parameter SUR
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Figure 5: The impact effect of contagion on the yield spread Italy-Germany.
Sources: Authors’ calculation.
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Figure 4: Interdependence and contagion between the yield spread Italy-Germany and the
global spread.
Sources: Authors’ calculation.
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estimation. Specifically, in Figure 5, we report the difference of the responses (of
the yield spread) in the two models to a given increase in the global spread of
100 basis points.
In the second half of 2011, the effect of contagion became sizeable.
Figure 5 shows that, because of market sentiment, the estimated impact
effect on the Italian yield spread is almost 200 basis points higher. This
evidence suggests that in late 2011, the Italian yield spread started to deviate
significantly from its fundamentals-driven equilibrium and its fluctuations
became increasingly dominated by shifts in market sentiment. Favero and
Missale (2012) report similar evidence for Spain. Financial markets not only
exert their disciplinary role discontinuously but their overreaction to global
risk is itself an important source of instability. In late 2011 and early 2012,
market sentiment played a major role in the pricing of default risk in Italy
and Spain, a fact which called for “a lender of last resort” to halt the debt
run and its spreading to safer member States.
4.4 The ECB announcement of OMTs
On 2 August 2012, the ECB announced the possibility of OMTs, that is, unlimited
secondary market purchases of bonds of member States receiving financial
assistance from the ESM under a program that includes ESM primary market
purchases.
As shown by the GVAR estimation over the two subsamples and discussed
in Section 4.2, the ECB announcement of OMTs led to a steady decline in
Quanto CDSs and to a significant fall in the yield spreads of Italy and Spain.
The strong influence that the ECB announcement had on market expectations
is well evidenced by our estimate of the effect of contagion based on the
difference between the impact effect of the global spread as estimated in the
multivariate GARCH model and in the constant parameter SUR system. Figure 5
shows that the impact effect associated with shifts in market sentiment is
significantly lower in the second subsample, pointing to a substantial effect
on market expectations of the ECB’s willingness to act as a quasi-lender of last
resort. We interpret this finding as further evidence of the non-fundamental
nature of the Italian debt crisis in 2011–2012 and the role of self-fulling
expectations in making a run equilibrium possible. Quite revealingly of the
self-fulfilling nature of the Italian crisis, no bonds have yet been purchased
under the OMT program.
The strong effect that the OMT announcement had on investors’ expecta-
tions and interest rates shows the importance of a lender of last resort in
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insuring the market against the risk of a liquidity crisis. However, to the extent
that the ECB’s ability to buy member States’ bonds reduces the risk of a self-
fulfilling debt run, it also deprives Eurobonds of a role in crisis prevention. The
implications of the ESM–ECB scheme for Eurobonds are discussed in the next
section.
5 The crisis-prevention role of Eurobonds
with the ESM–ECB scheme
A lender of last resort, prepared to buy unlimited amounts of a member State’s
bonds if necessary, is the best way to halt a debt run and prevent a propagation
of the crisis. If the central bank cannot act as a lender of last resort, the
possibility to issue Eurobonds in case of a debt run would ensure market access
to a country with financing difficulties and halt a debt crisis that would rapidly
propagate to other countries. In particular, the yield on Eurobonds would be
immune to the changes in market sentiment observed in our econometric
analysis. Eurobonds jointly guaranteed by all member States would ensure the
funding needed to roll over the maturing debt at a reasonable cost and give
time, and financial breathing space, for fiscal adjustment. To avoid moral
hazard, the right to issue Eurobonds could be granted only to member States
satisfying ex-ante conditions regarding their debt sustainability. In order to
prevent countries with high interest rates from issuing Eurobonds to reduce
borrowing costs at the expense of relatively safer States, their use could be
limited to crisis situations, say, when the yield spread observed in the secondary
market exceeds a pre-specified threshold. Then, the mere right to issue
Eurobonds, if credible, would be enough to avoid a debt run, i. e. a panic
equilibrium where each investor refuses to roll over the debt for fear that any-
body else would do the same. If the crisis were one of liquidity, no Eurobond
would have to be issued.
The establishment of the ESM, and the design of the ESM–ECB scheme for
financial assistance, have probably made Eurobonds unnecessary as an instru-
ment for crisis prevention. In fact, a country facing a debt run can now rely on
the ESM Primary Market Support Facility, i. e. the drawdown of an ESM
precautionary credit line for bond purchases on the primary market (up to
50% of the issue amount), and on OMTs, i. e. the ECB’s unlimited purchase of
bonds with a maturity between 1 and 3 years on the secondary market. If
credible, the joint intervention of the ESM in the primary market and the ECB
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commitment to buy bonds in the secondary market removes the risk of a self-
fulfilling debt run.
The most compelling evidence of the insurance that the ECB can provide
against a self-fulfilling debt run is the market reaction to the ECB Governing
Council’s announcement on 2 August 2012 that the ECB would undertake
OMTs in the secondary bond market.9 The announcement gave content to
Mario Draghi’s statement that he would do “whatever it takes” to defend the
euro, and triggered a rapid decline in yield spreads of Italian and Spanish
bonds that fell from about 500–300 basis points in less than three months.
This dramatic reduction is well captured by the increased sensitivity of yield
spreads to the “euro risk” factor and by the effect of improved market
sentiment shown in Figure 5. This evidence supports the view of De
Grauwe (2011, 2013) that the lack of a lender of last resort was what the
market feared the most. Importantly, the announcement of OMTs has so far
worked by stabilizing investors’ expectations with no need for bond pur-
chases by the ECB.
The strong effect that the OMT announcement had on investors’ expecta-
tions and interest rates shows the reassurance provided by the Central Bank’
ability to buy debt. However, if a lender of last resort is what the market
wants to solve the coordination problem and avoid a debt run, it is worth
noting that the OMT program does not make the ECB a genuine lender of last
resort. For the ECB to intervene with bond purchases on the secondary
market, a member States that needs financial assistance must first activate
an ESM precautionary program, i. e. a credit line to be used for ESM bond
purchases in the primary market under a Primary Market Support Facility.
Precautionary assistance from the ESM is subject to the fulfillment of elig-
ibility criteria, i. e. ex-ante conditionality, and the signing of a memorandum
of understanding, i. e. ex-post conditionality. Eligibility criteria include a
sustainable public debt, a sustainable external position and a sound finan-
cial system. Ex-post conditionality refers to specific policy actions, e. g. fiscal
adjustment and reforms, to achieve the objectives indicated in the memor-
andum of understanding.
Introducing ex-post conditionality (in addition to eligibility criteria) was
necessary to overcome political resistance against ECB intervention, but it has
negative consequences. First, conditioning ECB intervention on fiscal and policy
adjustment appears unnecessary when a country already satisfies the eligibility
9 The technical framework of these operations was formulated on 6 September 2012.
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requirements of sustainable public debt and a sound financial system. If the ex-
ante condition is met, and the crisis is one of liquidity, the requirement of fiscal
adjustment can send the wrong signal and impair the ability of the ECB to act as
a lender of last resort when this is economically justified. Secondly, and more
importantly, because of the stigma implied by the imposition of fiscal measures,
a country can be reluctant to ask for assistance even in the midst of a liquidity
crisis when timely intervention by the Central Bank is crucial (see, e. g. Vanden
Bosh 2012).10
Clearly, if the ESM-ECB framework were ever tested and proved to be too
restrictive to provide rapid and effective liquidity assistance either because of
political delays in the request for assistance or in the design of the adjustment
program, then the case for Eurobonds to maintain market access in crisis
situations would strongly re-emerge. However, at present, this appears a remote
possibility.
6 The role of Eurobonds – concluding remarks
Despite its rigidity, the ESM–ECB scheme for precautionary financial assistance
has so far been successful in stabilizing investors’ expectations and halting the
run on the Italian and Spanish debt. In any case, constraints preventing the ECB
from acting rapidly in crisis situations should not be an argument for introdu-
cing Eurobonds, but rather an incentive for a reform that makes ESM financial
assistance available on the fulfillment of ex-ante conditionality, as in the case of
IMF assistance under the Flexible Credit Line.
More importantly, the introduction of Eurobonds as a crisis instrument
faces strong political opposition because it raises moral hazard issues, and
Eurobonds have economic costs that safer member States are not willing to
pay. Giving a member State the option to issue a bond jointly guaranteed by
all other States, even if not exercised, is an implicit contingent liability for
States with stronger fiscal fundamentals. While such costs are certain and
immediate, the gains from increased liquidity will eventually arise only in a
distant future, as they require that a market for Eurobonds as large and deep
as that of US Treasuries develops. It is then not surprising that Eurobond
proposals have faced the strong opposition of safer member States like
10 Other features of the ESM–ECB scheme, such as the limitation of OMTs to bonds in the
maturity segment between 1 and 3 years, appear unduly restrictive and may limit the scope of
ECB intervention.
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Finland, Germany and the Netherlands. As the benefits for the latter coun-
tries would arise mainly because of a stronger Monetary Union, Eurobonds
will never be used for crisis prevention without the aim for greater fiscal
unity. The solidarity, cooperation and political foresight that would be
needed for jointly guaranteed EU debt are simply not present in the EU at
the moment.
If the opposition to the use of Eurobonds for deficit financing and debt roll-
over is understandable, the hope for jointly guaranteed EU debt can stay alive if
Eurobonds are linked to specific projects or expenditures that provide benefits to
all member States. A small scale program for financing investments or expendi-
tures that have positive externalities and spillover effects could gain political
consensus and have some chance of success.
The idea is to issue Eurobonds in order to finance projects and/or expendi-
tures that provide benefits to all member States also because of spillover effects
and/or externalities. This is clearly the case for EU infrastructure projects, but a
similar argument can be made for any public investment that increases output
across the EU through spillover effects. More recently, it has been argued that
extraordinary expenditures to deal with the refugee crisis and/or to enhance
security should be financed with Eurobonds. As these problems are common to
all member States and the expenditures incurred by each member State have
clear positive externalities to other States, Eurobonds seem the appropriate
instruments to share the borrowing cost and credit risk associated with their
financing.
Furthermore, issuance of Eurobonds backed by several and joint guaran-
tees would represent an important first experiment to test investors’ demand
and borrowing costs. A common Eurobond program would enhance the
credibility of EU institutions by signaling a political will for greater fiscal
unity and cooperation, thus paving the way for a deeper reform of EU fiscal
governance.
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